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PATRON DEMAND DEPOSIT ACCOUNT AND REGIONAL
PATRONAGE FINANCING ACTIVITIES OF AGRIBUSINESS COOPERATIVES
Abstract: This paper investigates agribusiness cooperatives' reliance on patron demand deposit
accounts (PDDAs) and regional patronage as sources of capital. Approximately 13% of
cooperatives carry PDDAs, typically fruit cooperatives, of which over one-half have no financial
protection against large unexpected withdrawals. Cooperatives with PDDAs must be concerned
with potential legal conflicts regarding the handling of these accounts, as evidenced by a U.S.
Supreme Court case classifying PDDAs as securities. Supply cooperatives are most likely to
show investment in other cooperatives as a high percentage of total assets, which could generate
insolvency issues for locals.
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Introduction
Like all business enterprises, agribusiness cooperatives have some authority to choose
which forms of financing activities to use. However, the system of patronage unique to
cooperatives creates two options of financing not available to investor-owned-firms (IOFs):
patron demand deposit accounts (PDDAs) and regional patronage. Funds remaining as a result of
unpaid pool proceeds or deposited into a cooperative patron's accounts, which receive interest
payments and are available upon demand of the patron, constitute in large part PDDAs. These
arrangements create inexpensive financing for the cooperative and profitable investments for
their patron-depositors. Regional patronage financing occurs when local cooperatives rely upon
cash patronage and retired equity payments from regional cooperatives to increase net income
and/or rely upon retained equity in those regional cooperatives to increase total assets.
There is reason for concern regarding PDDA and regional patronage financing. If a
cooperative were to primarily depend upon the use of these funds, there exists a risk that these
funds will not be available, causing serious financial strain on the cooperative. For instance, the
"demand" characteristic of PDDAs allows patrons to withdraw funds from their PDDAs
whenever they choose. If a large amount of funds held in PDDAs were to be withdrawn at one
time, the cooperative may run short of operating funds, possibly to the extent that they could not
distribute those monies demanded. Under these circumstances, patrons are faced with not
knowing if or when they will receive their money. If the cooperative were to fall into
bankruptcy, it is then held liable to its patrons for debt financing and accountable under federal
securities regulations. In the case of regional patronage financing, a local affiliated cooperative
may not receive an annual patronage payment from its regional cooperatives and be forced to
look for other financing to support operating funds.3
Notwithstanding that PDDA financing has been in use for approximately 20 years, some
cooperatives are unaware of the potentially severe implications these funds may bring (Duft
1988, 1998). Local cooperatives have relied upon patronage received from regional cooperatives
for several decades. Some cooperatives have grown dependent upon these funds to show a net
operating profit. Therefore, an objective of this study was to determine the extent to which
PDDA and regional patronage financing activities are relied upon and analyze the implications
of using them in order to provide information to cooperatives for their decision-making
purposes. Further, we sought to identify the characteristics of agribusiness cooperatives that
make them more predisposed to use PDDA and regional patronage financing activities. First, the
extent to which cooperatives carry PDDAs was analyzed. Second, factors were identified which
affect the likelihood that a particular cooperative will be involved with PDDA financing. Third,
we analyzed the severity of local cooperatives' financial dependence upon regional cooperatives.
Finally, we analyzed the factors which influence a local cooperative to be financially dependent
upon a regional cooperative.
Patron Demand Deposit Accounts
Partly due to record high levels of the prime lending rate, United States agriculture was
faced with great financial strain in the late 1970's and early 1980's. As a result, agricultural
cooperatives needed lower cost sources of financing than were available through established
banking institutions. Additionally, many cooperatives had met their maximum allowed
borrowing capacity from banks (Bartsch and Dahigren 1997; Duft 1988). Of course, farmers,
who were the members of these cooperatives, were concurrently experiencing financial stress.
Additionally, members began to express their unease that cooperatives had continued to retain
equity (non-interest-bearing money) which they owned but could not use. The culmination of4
these factors in the late 1970's led to the creation of PDDAs in Washington State (Duft 1988,
1998).
The fresh fruit and grain cooperative industries of the State of Washington have similar
systems of paying their member-growers for commodities. Upon delivery of the product, the
grower is paid a portion of the expected pool value. Subsequent pool payments are made to the
grower throughout the following months as portions of the product are sold by the cooperative.
By spring, payments begin overlapping with grower supply purchases and storage payments to
the cooperative. In some grower-cooperative relationships, it was suggested that those later
payments simply be credited to the member-grower's account, against which purchases or
payments could be made, or funds withdrawn if needed, by the member (Duft 1988, 1998).
At this point, cooperatives recognized that they were being allowed access to capital at
no cost, and members saw that they were providing the cooperative with capital, at no cost. From
this realization, a modest rate of interest was then paid to the grower for the amount of funds in
their accounts. This rate was set to fall in the window above that which the member could gain
from placing that money in a savings or related deposit account at the local bank and below the
rate paid by the cooperative for borrowing operating funds from a banking institution (Duft
1988, 1998; Hanson et al. 1999).
It also appears that some of the payments made to grain producers were kept as credit
balances in order to delay payment until the next tax year for the purpose of a tax benefit to the
grower. In these cases, the member may have been paid a similar rate of interest for the time in
which the payment was deferred (Duft 1988).
The use of PDDAs spread rapidly from Washington State throughout the Northwest and
into other regions of the country. In fact, in Washington alone, funds in PDDAs grew from5
approximately three million dollars in the early 1980's to around 100 million dollars in 1986
(Duft 1988, 1998). This exponential increase in PDDAs brought about concern, which led to the
discovery of several potential problems. One drawback with PDDAs is that members are allowed
to deposit additional funds in their grower demand accounts that may or may not be patronage
related. These monies were sometimes personal funds generated from function other than
agricultural production. Occasionally, funds were also being accepted from the general public.
Allowing these situations to occur could be destructive to cooperative principals, such as non-
appreciating stock value, limited return on patrons' invested capital, and equal access to services
by all patrons (Duft 1988, 1998).
Second, a conflict of interest arose when the individuals who set the rate paid on such
funds (the cooperative's management and the Board of Directors) were allowed to leave large
sums of money in PDDAs. Another discrepancy arose when there was a drastic decrease in the
prime rate, e.g. the cooperative's Board of Directors may not have been able to meet in a timely
manner to lower the interest rate paid, so that it reflected the prime rate change (Duft 1988,
1998). As a result, the cooperative would sometimes be paying a higher rate of interest on
PDDAs than on their commercial loans.
Third, the tax treatment of interest paid on PDDAs came into question. It was not clear
whether the Internal Revenue Service would consider it to be the cost of debt, investment
earnings of patrons, or patronage allocations to members (Duft 1988, 1998; Hanson et al. 1999).
Finally, there are legal questions with the use of PDDAs. Funds in PDDAs are available to
the member upon their demand. If a large quantity of these funds were to be requested by members
at once, the cooperative may have invested those monies elsewhere, or simply not have the available
capital at that time to comply with the requests. Cooperatives are not held responsible to provide6
security for their equity holders with the FDIC or a similar organization, as banks are (Duft 1988,
1998). Beyond a cooperative's line of credit being available through a bank to cover large PDDA
withdrawals,  there  is  therefore  no  security  protection  for  account  holders  against  those funds in
PDDAs. Additionally, if a cooperative were to go bankrupt, the limited liability of cooperatives may
be challenged insofar as the member losses could exceed member investment.
This situation arose in Reeves v. Ernst and Young, which resulted from the bankruptcy of
Farmer's Cooperative of Arkansas and Oklahoma. Farmer's cooperative sold demand notes to its
patrons, a version of PDDAs, without clear disclosure as to the risks involved. It went into
bankruptcy and was unable to repay the patron demand notes. Note holders and the cooperative's
bankruptcy  trustee  sued  individuals  of  decision-making  authority  in  the  cooperative and the
cooperative's  accounting firm (Baarda 1989). The result was personal liability of directors,
accountants, lawyers, and other individuals, in addition to the decision that demand notes were in
fact "securities" (Baarda 1990). The cooperative was held accountable to antifraud provisions of
securities laws.
Regional Patronage Dependency
As  the  agricultural  cooperative  trend  developed  in  the  mid-1900's, some very successful
cooperatives grew to be recognized statewide, regionally, and even nationally. The benefits to being
a member of a cooperative enticed several small cooperatives to become members of larger regional
federated cooperatives. Over time, these member cooperatives built up large equities in the affiliated
regionals. Just as members of local cooperatives often wait for several years to receive retired equity
allocated to them for a certain year's patronage, the local cooperatives must also often wait many
years to receive membership equity from the regional cooperatives. If a strong financial dependency
is present, there exists the risk that business failure at the regional level will be detrimental to the7
financial viability of the local member cooperatives.
Previous Studies
Over the past two decades, research of agricultural cooperatives has been based on four main
topics: equity redemption, capital structure, developments in cooperative theory, and comparisons
between cooperatives and IOFs. Only six papers have been published in relation to PDDA financing
between 1988 and 1999. Of these, four have been strictly directed to the legal aspects of PDDAs
(Baarda 1989, 1990; Bartsch and Dahigren 1997; Hanson et al. 1999). The remaining two papers
dealt with the background and characteristics of PDDAs (Duft 1988, 1998). Additionally, two papers
analyzed federated patronage dependency of local cooperatives (Cobia, Ingalsbe, and Royer 1989;
Royer and Smith 1982).
Royer and Smith (1982) studied the intensity of member cooperatives equity in the affiliated
regionals.  Using  1976  data,  Royer  and  Smith  calculated that regional annual patronage refunds
accounted for 27.9% of net income and losses for locals. Investment in other cooperatives was found
to represent 8.5% of total assets and 24.2% of local patrons' equity. In 1989, Cobia, Ingalsbe, and
Royer emphasized the fact that local cooperatives have great limitations when they are not receiving
cash flow in the form of equity redemption and cash patronage from regional cooperatives.
Data
The cooperatives that were surveyed in this data set were identified from two sources, the
Washington State Council of Farmer Cooperatives and the USDA Rural Business - Cooperative
Service. The group was limited to exclude cooperatives that do not handle patronage in any way and
those  that  function  strictly  as  bargaining  associations.  Seafood  related  marketing or processing
cooperatives  and  those  that  would  soon be dissolving were also eliminated. Sixty-eight out the
seventy-two remaining agricultural cooperatives in the State of Washington voluntarily participated8
in the survey for this study. The interviews were conducted in-person in order to obtain a higher
response rate and facilitate better understanding of the survey than could have been possible with
phone interviews or mail surveys. The survey was designed to gather data on the cooperative's
demographics  (type  of  cooperative  and  its  structure), factors to determine existence and
characteristics of PDDAs, and presence and handling of regional patronage received. In addition,
1998 financial statements were collected. 
The  statistical  characteristics  of  the  sample  can be found in Table 1. Grain
handling/marketing cooperatives constituted 29.4% of the industry, 45.6% were farm supply
cooperatives, 20.6% handled and marketed fruits and vegetables, 1.5% dealt with products of the
dairy  industry,  and  the  remaining  2.9%  provided  strictly  financial  products. Almost all of the
cooperatives (95.6%) were locally owned by farmers and ranchers, whereas the remainder were
owned by larger cooperative structures, the regional or federated cooperatives. As expected, 92.7%
of  cooperatives were financially dependent upon regional patronage, with an average of 2.7%
regional  cooperatives  providing  patronage  payments  to  each  of the independent locals. The
cooperatives in our data set held retained equity for 13.3 years before retiring these funds to the
allocated members, with a range of zero to 34 years. Finally, the average age (length of operation)
of  the  cooperatives  in  our  sample  is  60  years.  Considering  recent  mergers  and  acquisitions,  this
ranged from two to 93 years.
Findings: Patron Demand Deposit Accounts
In general, PDDAs are no longer common in Washington State. The lack of PDDAs may be
caused by the fact that if cooperatives get into financial trouble and cannot cover their PDDAs, the
legal reprimands can be severe. We also found that many local cooperatives are dependent upon
their investments in other cooperatives to represent a large portion of total assets and the annual9
patronage payments from regional cooperatives to support higher net returns. 
Seven out of the nine cooperatives carrying PDDAs were fruit cooperatives; the remaining
two were grain cooperatives. Of the nine cooperatives with PDDAs, four stated that they did have
a financial support system in place to protect themselves in the event that a large portion of funds
in  PDDAs were suddenly demanded in withdrawals by the respective members. These support
systems included an operating line of credit that would cover all or a percentage of the funds tied
up in PDDAs and/or an agreement with the bank to cover these large withdrawals if they should
unexpectedly  occur.  Agreements  with  the  banking  institutions  verified  that  the  banks  were  aware
of the practice of PDDA financing being in use at the cooperatives and the risks involved. It appears
that the five cooperatives not supported by available credit are either ignorant of the risks involved
with PDDAs or are knowledgeable of that risk but do not consider it to be potentially hazardous to
their continued business operations.
For those cooperatives carrying PDDAs, a ratio was calculated of dollars in PDDAs to total
liabilities (see Table 1). This ratio averaged 0.135, ranging from 0.035 to 0.241. Although the actual
dollar amounts held in PDDAs may be very significant, it appears that the quantity of these funds
in relation to total liabilities is not extremely significant.
It was determined that two of these cooperatives held not only grower demand deposits, but
also grower debenture deposits, which carried time limitations within which the member could not
withdraw  funds.  These  debenture funds are considered long-term liabilities in their financial
statements, as opposed to demand deposit funds, which are short-term liabilities. At fiscal year end
1998, one of these cooperatives relied strictly upon grower debenture deposits for long-term debt
financing.
Of the 20 grain cooperatives surveyed, 16 allowed deferred payment contracts upon request10
of their members. Two of the 16 pay interest on these funds for the duration of the contract. Three
of  the  16  stated  that  they  pay  a  premium  on  grain  on  which  payment  is  deferred.  Under  these
premiums, the cooperative is safeguarded, as they are not paying interest to the member and are
therefore  not  involved  with  PDDAs.  Of the 14 fruit and vegetable cooperatives surveyed, three
carried late season pool payments as member account balances, on which one paid interest. Member-
patrons deposited funds as investment at three fruit cooperatives. None of the cooperatives accepted
deposits as investment from non-member patrons or public investors.
In cases where interest was paid on member accounts, the rate characteristics were fairly
consistent. Any one or a combination of the chief financial officer, controller, manager, or board of
directors are responsible for setting the interest rates. Such rates are determined according to either
CoBank lending rates, the prime rate, money market rates, demand deposit rates, or local bank rates
accessible for grower loans. In all cases the rate was adjusted monthly, except for one cooperative
applying a 5% flat rate.
With reference to the background of PDDAs, this study found a contradiction to previous
beliefs of the use of these funds. It was found that fruit and grain cooperatives typically do not
provide supply products to their members. The general implication of the managers interviewed was
that any funds receiving interest payments were not used as member account credit balances against
which to purchase products.
Factors Affecting the Choice to Use Patron Demand Deposit Accounts
Univariate  logit  models  can  be  used  to  analyze the factors affecting choices. We use a
standard  binary  choice  model  in  which  the  cooperative  chooses whether or not to use PDDA
financing.11
Formally,
(1) (,) Vyzz be =+
and
(2) 1,(.)0z, yifVor eb =‡‡-
0,(.)0, yifV =<
where V(.) is an unobserved latent response variable, $ is a vector of unknown parameters to be
estimated, z is a vector of explanatory variables,  denotes the error terms which are assumed to e
have a logistic distribution; and y is the dependent variable representing the observed outcome of
a binary choice. The choice equation (whether to use PDDAs) can be written as:










The conditional probability that a particular cooperative, given  z, will use PDDAs is given
by:
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The estimated logit equation was formulated as follows:
(5) 123 yfruityearsothercoops bbbe =+++
where:
y = patron demand deposit accounts (0 = no, I = yes) 12
fruit = fruit cooperative (0 = no, I = yes) 
years = number of years the cooperative has been in existence 
othercoops = total dollars invested in all other cooperatives
Other  variables  such  as  other  types  of  cooperatives  (grain,  supply,  dairy, and financial) were
excluded  from  this  formulation  of  the  logit  equation  because  they  were  not  statistically  significant
in predicting PDDA presence.
The  estimation  results  from  the  choice  equation  (5)  are  presented  in  Table  2.  All  of  the
explanatory variables have the expected sign and are significant. We find that fruit cooperatives are
likely to have PDDAs. The explanation for the positive effect is that as the pool payments in fruit
cooperatives  are  distributed over nearly half of the year, overlapping the time when grower
payments are made to the cooperative; whereas other cooperatives do not typically have this type
of payment system. Grain cooperatives use similar deferred payments; however they are usually
requested by the producer to serve as a tax benefit.
We find that a higher number of years that the cooperative has been in operation makes the
cooperative less likely to carry PDDAs. This is logical in that newer cooperatives would be more
likely  to  venture into diverse financing activities. Further, younger cooperatives would have been
faced with the financial agricultural hardships of the late 1970's and 1980's, having not had much
equity built up to carry them through this time. Compared with the more stable, older cooperatives,
these younger cooperatives had a greater need to find more efficient financing resources.
Finally, the results indicate that total investment in other cooperatives has a negative effect
on the probability that a cooperative will use PDDAs. This indicates that a local cooperative with
little investment in regional cooperatives is more likely to be active in PDDA financing than locals13
with larger regional equity stores. This is logical in that receiving a lesser amount of patronage from
other  cooperatives  would  bring  about  the  need  for  obtaining  operating  funds  from  some  other
source, for example, through PDDAs.
Findings: Regional Patronage Dependency
The  ratio  of  patronage received from other cooperatives to net income is a measure of
intensity  or  severity  of  a  cooperative's  dependency  upon  regional  patronage.  This  ratio  averaged
0.219, and ranged from -6.569 to 4.044 (see Table 1). It is apparent that some local cooperatives are
in fact significantly dependent upon regional patronage payments for profitability. Additionally, we
found  that  seven  local  cooperatives show a net operating loss if it were not for the patronage
received from other cooperatives. From the financial data, these cooperatives show a net loss before
receiving regional patronage and a net income if regional patronage payments added. If this situation
were  to  take  place  over  a  period  of  several  consecutive years, long-run viability of the local
cooperative is potentially being misrepresented to its member-patrons.
In a cooperative's financial statements, investment in other cooperatives is listed under non-
current assets. When investment in other cooperatives accounts for a significant percentage of total
assets, the cooperative's ability to remain solvent is decreased, as these funds can only be made
available at the discretion of all other cooperatives in which equity is held. The following linear
regression model uses a ratio of investment in other cooperatives to total assets (HOC/TA) as the
dependent variable. Of the cooperatives surveyed, their IIOC/TA ratio averaged 0.146, ranging from
0.0 to 0.551 (see Table 1). This indicates that some of Washington's agribusiness cooperatives are
heavily invested in other cooperatives and have a significant potential for insolvency conflicts.
In  order  to  analyze  the  relationship  between  certain  cooperative  characteristics  and
investment-in other-cooperatives-to-total-assets ratio, we estimated the following equation: 14
(6) 01 / IIOCTAsupply+retire+e bb =+
where:
supply = supply cooperative (0 = no, I = yes) 
retire = number of years for local cooperative to retire local certificates of equity 
e = white noise error term
The estimation results from the choice equation (6) are presented in Table 3. Other types of
cooperatives (grain, fruit, dairy, and financial) were excluded from this model because they are not
statistically significant. The coefficients for both of the explanatory variables are positive and highly
significant.  The  supply  cooperatives  have  higher  investment-in  other-cooperatives-to-total-assets
ratio. This can be explained by the fact that most supply cooperatives are members of Cenex/Harvest
States, one of the largest regional cooperatives in the United States.  They obtain a large portion of
their products from Cenex/Harvest States and therefore hold large equities in this particular regional
cooperative. Fruit, grain, dairy, and financial cooperatives tend to be more diversified in the equity
they hold in other cooperatives. For instance, these types of cooperatives would be patrons to a
number  of  smaller,  more  specialized  regional  or  local  cooperatives,  resulting  in  a  less significant
total equity in other cooperatives.
The results also indicate that the number of years that it takes the local cooperative to retire
local certificates of equity has a positive correlation with investment-in other-cooperatives-to-total-
assets ratio. This is relevant in that regional cooperatives may not revolve equity in those years of
difficult  financial circumstances, subsequently accumulating higher values investment-in other-
cooperatives-to-total-assets  ratio  for  the  local  member  cooperatives  (Cobia,  Ingalsbe,  and  Royer
1989). The resulting decreased cash flow in regional patronage makes it more difficult to distribute15
local equity stores to members, prolonging the number of years it takes for the local cooperative to
retire certificates of equity to its members.
During the interview process, managers were asked how regional patronage received was
accounted for and distributed to local members. In theory, it can be done one of two ways. First, a
regional patronage check (current cash patronage plus the previous year's retired equity) may be
deposited in the local cooperative's general fund and accounted for as a portion of net income, which
is  then  allocated  to  local  members  as  the  current  year's patronage equity. Second, a regional
patronage payment may be deposited and recorded separately as the current year's cash patronage
and retired equity from a specific year's allocation. The local cooperative's extensive equity records
system  would  immediately  distribute  the  regional  retired  equity  funds  to  the  patrons  who  were
allocated local equity in that same fiscal year. In other words, regional retired equity would not be
given to current local patrons; rather, it would be passed directly to those members who funded local
cooperative operations in the year of the earlier regional equity allocation.
We  found  that  all  cooperatives  used  the  first  method.  Therefore,  local  cooperatives are
relying heavily upon regional patronage payments to provide a greater amount of operating capital.
More specifically, net income is higher because regional retired equity is kept with regional cash
patronage, as opposed to the second option above. This higher level of net income leaves a greater
amount of funds to be allocated as the current year's local cash patronage or retained equity, the later
creating operating capital. If local cooperatives were to use the second option described earlier, they
would be retiring a greater amount of local equity. This would result in decreasing the length of time
equity  is  held, creating a more satisfied membership, and eventually decreasing the financial
dependence upon regional cooperatives.
We found that many local cooperatives have equity stored in regional cooperatives that was16
allocated to them several years previous. Some local managers were not aware of how many years'
worth of equity their cooperative had built-up in the regional cooperatives. Recently, with mergers
of the larger regional cooperatives, for example, the Cenex/Harvest States/Land 0' Lakes merger of
1998,  equity  distribution  is  being  slowed  further to facilitate higher than normal capital
requirements.
Conclusions
During  the  period  of  financial  difficulty  in  agriculture  of  the  late  1970's  and 1980's,
agricultural cooperatives and producers began looking for more efficient methods of financing. The
benefits of reserving patronage-sourced funds as operating capital, with the cost of interest paid to
the respective patrons, became widely used in Washington State. This practice became known as
PDDA  financing. Secondly, local cooperatives increasingly began to rely on patronage received
from regional cooperatives to support local annual net income.
This  study analyzed these two forms of financing. Using a survey of agribusiness
cooperatives in the State of Washington, we found that nine of the 68 cooperatives carried PDDAs
and 63 received annual patronage payments from regional cooperatives. Fruit cooperatives are most
likely  to  be  active  in  PDDA  financing.  Additionally,  newer  cooperatives  and  those  with  a  lower
investment in other cooperatives are more likely to carry PDDAs. Of the cooperatives involved with
PDDA  financing,  approximately  half  have  anticipated  the possibility of financial failure due to a
sudden, large withdrawal of such funds. These cooperatives have secured operating lines of credit
and/or other agreements with their banking institutions to protect their financial position if such an
event should occur. However, the outcome of Reeves v. Ernst and Young, which classifies patron
demand notes as securities, indicates that there is sufficient cause for concern for all cooperatives
paying interest to their member-patrons-depositors for the use of their funds.17
The results from a linear regression model allow us to conclude that supply cooperatives are
most likely to be dependent upon regional patronage received. We also found that the greater the
number  of  years  that  local  cooperatives  retain  equity  with  a  greater  level  of  investment in other
cooperatives. Results from a ratio of investment in other cooperatives to total assets indicate that
some  local  cooperatives  could  face  insolvency  difficulties  with this ratio being as high as 0.551.
From their financial data, we noted that seven out of 65 cooperatives relied upon regional patronage
payments to show a net income rather than a net loss in 1998. Given these findings, we conclude that
some  local  cooperatives are becoming too dependent on their investment earnings in other
cooperatives for their financial status to be acceptable to their local patrons.
The purpose of a cooperative is to best serve its members. When regional patronage is not
being redeemed to its members (local cooperatives), then local cooperatives are not able to redeem
local patronage as efficiently to their members (producers). Therefore, regional cooperatives are not
serving their membership as effectively as possible.18
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics
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YEARS
(years in existence)
60.0 20.5 2 93 68
RETIRE
(years to retire local
equity)






$183,511 724,672 0 $5,876,000 65
NI
(net income)




$4,227,880 28,380,028 0 $229,446,000 65
TA
(total assets)
$366,327,544 2,486,823,570 $122,659 $19,914,914,000 6520
Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics (cont’d)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Cases
PDDADOL
(quantity of funds in
PDDAs)
$4,516,126 8,341,623 $391,256 $23,310,000 7
TL
(total liabilities)
$320,079,216 2,295,252,080 $46,431 $18,465,332,000 65
PE
(patrons’ equity)



























0.135 0.090 0.035 0.241 721
Table 2.  Discrete Choice Model Estimation Results.  Dependent variable:  Use of PDDAs
Variable Name Coefficients t-statistics Marginal Effects
Fruit 2.02* 2.67 0.437E-2
Years -0.03* -3.40 -0.612E-4
Other coops -1.20E-6* -.203 -0.248E-8
Correct Predictions 83.08%
*The coefficient is significant at "=-.0122








*The coefficient is significant at " = 0.01